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Algeria Gate: The case of Ayoub Aissiou has evolved from an extradition dispute into a wider political and media campaign. While Aissiou’s supporters portray him as an Algerian opposition figure persecuted for criticizing the authorities, the judicial proceedings in Spain and Algeria also concern allegations of forgery, money laundering, and the transfer of assets abroad.

On August 21, 2026, an open letter called on French President Emmanuel Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez to intervene to secure Aissiou’s release and allow him to return to France. The campaign includes prominent French figures, some of whom are associated with pro-Israel circles and activities linked to CRIF, as well as Boualem Sansal.

The campaign has raised questions about why a case involving serious financial allegations is being presented primarily as a political dispute.

Aissiou’s Judicial Record

Aissiou was arrested at Barcelona–El Prat Airport on July 25 after arriving from Casablanca. Algeria had submitted an extradition request based on an international arrest warrant issued by its Economic and Financial Criminal Division on April 9, 2026.

According to Spanish reporting, the investigation concerns three allegedly forged powers of attorney dating from 2019, which were reportedly used to manage real-estate assets and transfer proceeds abroad. The allegations include forgery, use of forged documents, and money laundering. Aissiou’s defense denies the charges and describes the proceedings as politically motivated.

His wider judicial record is also significant. In December 2025, he was sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison and fined 8 million dinars in a money-laundering case involving an organized criminal group and alleged corruption proceeds. The sentence was upheld by the Algiers Court of Appeal in March 2026.

Other cases have involved companies, an iron factory in M’Sila, agricultural and dairy projects, imports, and a real-estate project in Kolea. Investigators have alleged that companies linked to the Aissiou brothers were used to move or conceal substantial sums of money.

These cases provide the financial background to Algeria’s efforts to bring Aissiou back, not only to enforce existing convictions, but potentially to investigate the movement of assets and money abroad.

French Companies and Assets

French commercial records link Aissiou to several companies, including REAL INVEST CORP, ONE INVEST CORP, MY & DA, and SCI Les Jasmins.

He has held management or executive positions in several of these entities. REAL INVEST CORP, for example, has capital of €100,000 and lists Aissiou as a manager and shareholder. ONE INVEST CORP entered judicial liquidation in March 2026.

These records confirm his legal involvement in French companies, although they do not establish the value of his personal assets or the ownership of every asset linked to these businesses.

Claims have circulated that Aissiou’s signature could be necessary to move certain assets and that some wealth may have been redirected toward Morocco. However, no publicly available bank records or agreements reviewed so far conclusively establish such transfers or an arrangement involving protection in exchange for assets.

For that reason, the alleged Moroccan financial trail remains an area requiring further investigation rather than an established fact.

Why Morocco Matters

Aissiou’s arrest after arriving from Casablanca has added another dimension to the case. His journey from Morocco does not, by itself, prove that the country was used to protect his assets or arrange his relocation.

Nevertheless, given the existing allegations concerning the transfer of money abroad, investigators could examine whether Moroccan companies, intermediaries, powers of attorney, or assets became connected to his network after the Algerian investigations began.

If future banking or corporate documents confirm transfers from France to Morocco, the case could develop into a broader cross-border investigation into the concealment or relocation of assets.

The Paris Campaign

The open letter seeking Aissiou’s release was launched by Daniel Salvatore Schiffer, with the participation of Marek Halter and Hassen Chalghoumi, and was signed by several prominent French personalities, including Pascal Bruckner, Arno Klarsfeld, Bernard Kouchner, and Boualem Sansal.

Some signatories have links to France’s pro-Israel political and media sphere or to organizations associated with CRIF. This does not establish that CRIF organized the campaign, nor does it prove any financial relationship between the signatories and Aissiou.

However, the composition of the campaign raises questions about the political networks mobilized around his case and why they are seeking intervention before the Spanish judiciary completes its review.

The publication of the appeal in Le Journal du Dimanche has further amplified the campaign, giving the issue access to a major French media platform.

The Central Question

The key issue is whether Aissiou’s case should be treated primarily as political persecution or as a judicial matter involving serious financial allegations.

His defense is entitled to argue that the charges are politically motivated. Ultimately, however, the Spanish courts must assess Algeria’s extradition request and determine whether the legal requirements for extradition are met.

For Algeria, the stakes go beyond enforcing a prison sentence. Aissiou’s return could potentially shed light on the movement of money, corporate structures, powers of attorney, beneficiaries, and assets allegedly transferred abroad.

The case therefore raises a broader question for France and Spain: Will judicial cooperation prevail, or will political and media pressure succeed in preventing the Algerian judiciary from pursuing the financial trail surrounding Aissiou?

Bab El Djazair News Portal: Before the Financial Times described Emirati expansion in Africa as an “imperial” push, before Human Rights Watch tracked Colombian mercenaries through UAE military facilities to Sudan, and before Reuters revealed that a $50 million ransom financed an al-Qaeda attack in Mali (with three regional sources attributing the payment to the UAE), President Abdelmadjid Tebboune had already, in March 2024, mapped the danger in three countries by name: Mali, Libya and Sudan.

He said the money of an unnamed Arab state was present “in every place where there is conflict,” listed those three countries, and declared that “patience has limits.” More than two years later, the importance of that statement lies in the precision of the geography he chose: the three arenas have successively become the subject of UN reports and international investigations into weapons, gold, mercenaries, financing and networks of influence linked to the UAE.

This does not mean every Algerian accusation has been proven, nor that the president formally named the UAE on every occasion. Yet placing the statements on a timeline and overlaying later evidence shows Algeria was reading a pattern early: massive capital moving beyond borders, ports and strategic assets, relationships with armed actors, and security and financial tools far beyond traditional investment.

January 2024… The Warning First Came from the High Security Council

On January 10th 2024, President Tebboune chaired a High Security Council meeting on the neighbourhood and the Sahel. The statement expressed regret at “hostile actions” by a “brotherly Arab country” towards Algeria, without naming it. Media linked the reference to the UAE; the first institutional warning.

The region was changing rapidly: Mali had ended the Algiers Agreement process, Libya remained divided, and Sudan was locked in war since April 2023. Earlier Emirati support for Khalifa Haftar had already been documented, including violations of the Libyan arms embargo and a major airlift in 2020. Algeria saw external financial and military powers altering the balances around its borders.

March 2024… Tebboune Draws the Map: Mali, Libya, Sudan

On 30 March 2024, Tebboune spoke publicly and in detail about the crisis with the Gulf state, still without naming it. He kept a diplomatic tone at first, then accused the actions of “arrogance” and drew a red line: Algeria “does not bow.”

The key phrase: “Wherever there is conflict, we find the money of this state: in Mali, in Libya, in Sudan… patience has limits.” He placed money at the heart of the economy of conflicts—who finances, who allies with whom, who can reshape the balance inside a weak state.

Anwar Gargash replied indirectly on 2 April about a “distant sisterly state” using hints against the UAE. Two months later, SWISSAID revealed that 435 tonnes of gold worth over $30 billion left Africa undeclared in 2022, with the UAE the main destination (about 405 tonnes). Over the previous decade, unrecorded African gold appearing in UAE imports exceeded 2,500 tonnes, valued at more than $115 billion. Dubai had become a central corridor for African wealth leaking outside official records.

2025… From Warning Against a State to Warning Against a Model of Intervention

By October 2025, Tebboune said Algeria’s Gulf relations were good “except for one state,” linking the problem to interference in internal affairs and an attempt at “ruin in my house.”

On 11 November, while receiving the Somali president, he described Sudan’s tragedy as caused by “blatant interventions that stoke discord.” Amnesty International had already documented modern weapons, including from the UAE, in the Sudanese war, and later concluded that advanced Chinese weapons “almost certainly” re-exported from the UAE had reached the Rapid Support Forces. Abu Dhabi denied supporting any side. Sudan’s case against the UAE at the ICJ was dismissed in May 2025 for lack of jurisdiction.

December 2025… Tunisia Enters Algeria’s National Security Circle

On 30 December, Tebboune warned against attempts to drive a wedge between Algeria and Tunisia, stressing that the security of both is interconnected and that Algeria does not interfere in Tunisian affairs. The doctrine was clear: non-interference is a principle of regional security, not a slogan against one adversary.

February 2026… The Accusation Moves to Elections and Investment Capital

On 7 February, Tebboune openly accused the unnamed “state, not to say a mini-state” of intervening in Algerian elections and of threatening arbitration over investments. He closed with a severe warning: “Do not make us regret the day we came to know you.” The same day Algeria began terminating the 2013 air-services agreement with the UAE. The issue now encompassed political interference, capital and legal pressure.

July 2026… The Harshest Phrase: “Wherever They Set Foot, Blood Flows”

In a 27 July interview, Tebboune described the party as a “small state” with a “very negative” effect and uttered the sharpest line of the chronology: “Wherever they set foot, blood flows,” adding that Algeria possesses evidence. He linked Tunisia’s security directly to Algeria’s and said he would have cut relations long ago were it not for the desire to avoid further Arab divisions.

Then Came the Documents: Mercenaries, Weapons and Sudan’s Routes

In May 2026, Human Rights Watch reported that hundreds of Colombian contractors were trained by Emiratis inside the UAE before deployment to Sudan, with the Abu Dhabi-based Global Security Services Group appearing in the recruitment. The UAE denied allowing its territory to be used for such purposes.

The Financial Times in August estimated around 2,000 Colombian fighters reached Sudan via routes through the UAE, Libya, Somalia and Chad, some trained on drones and air defence. The U.S. Treasury had already sanctioned a Colombian recruitment network in December 2025 and identified a retired Colombian officer resident in the UAE as a central figure, without officially attributing the network to the Emirati government. Reuters had earlier tracked dozens of flights from the UAE to Am Djarass in Chad that raised suspicions of supplying the Rapid Support Forces.

Mali… The Most Dangerous Intersection with the March 2024 Statement

In March 2024 Tebboune had placed Mali at the top of the list. In August 2026 a UN Security Council experts’ report revealed that a roughly $50 million ransom paid in late 2025 financed a major JNIM attack in Mali. Three regional sources told Reuters the payer was the UAE. Usual ransoms ranged from $4–6 million; experts described $50 million as extraordinary. The UN report itself did not name the payer, but the intersection with Tebboune’s earlier warning about “money” in Mali is highly sensitive.

Libya… The Arena That Preceded the Warning

Libya’s path predated the 2024 statements. UN and rights reports had long documented Emirati support for Haftar, including drones and an airlift of at least 160 flights in early 2020. When Tebboune grouped Mali, Libya and Sudan together, Libya already stood as a living model of external financing, weapons and proxy activity. Sensitivity rose again in 2024 when Haftar’s forces moved near the Algerian border.

Ports and Gold… When Influence Becomes Economic Before It Becomes Military

The Financial Times investigation of August 2026 mapped a broader picture: more than $168 billion in announced Emirati projects in Africa since 2017 across ports, minerals, land, energy and logistics. The issue is not legitimate investment itself, but the accumulation of control at the same chokepoints—port, corridor, resource, financial centre—sometimes paired with security presence or armed alliances.

Gold remains the clearest example: if the UAE is the largest destination for unrecorded African gold, influence is measured by Dubai’s ability to turn African material into globally tradable money. Claims of systematic “buying of consciences” lack documentary proof as state policy; what is documented is a highly attractive environment for money and elites, as shown by the Dubai Unlocked investigation.

Even London… An Emirati-Financed Mercenary Outside African Arenas

An ITV News investigation of 19 August 2026 revealed that security contractor Abraham Golan, previously linked to UAE operations in Yemen, ran a surveillance operation in London in 2016 against British activist Anas al-Tikriti while receiving Emirati funds. The investigation did not prove a direct government order for assassination, but it added another example of Emirati-financed contractors operating far beyond traditional borders—reinforcing that private military tools are part of a wider pattern, not a solitary Algerian claim.

From Warning to Doctrine: Why Tebboune’s Reading Appears Prophetic

Tebboune did not predict any single report. He identified early the structure of the danger that later investigations would examine: money rather than conventional armies; Mali, Libya and Sudan rather than a narrow bilateral dispute; then internal interference, elections, investment pressure and finally the comprehensive formula of a “very negative” effect accompanied by blood.

Parallel evidence moved in the same direction: tens of billions in gold flows, alleged re-exported weapons, suspicious flights, a Colombian recruitment network, around 2,000 fighters, a $50 million ransom that reshaped jihadist financing in Mali, and ports and investments drawing a map of influence larger than the Gulf state itself.

The UAE continues to deny supporting the Rapid Support Forces or allowing mercenary recruitment on its soil, and defends its African investments as developmental partnerships (citing more than $110 billion committed between 2019 and 2023). Those replies no longer close the file, because the questions no longer come from Algeria alone.

Algeria Was Not Warning Against the UAE’s Wealth… But Against the Function of Money

Tebboune never objected to the UAE being rich or investing in Africa. Algeria itself seeks investment and maintains close ties with other Gulf states. The consistent question in his discourse was: what does money do when it leaves the economy and enters internal politics and war?

Money that builds a factory or a commercial port can create value. Money that reaches an armed faction, finances a terrorist ransom, sustains a mercenary network or pressures sovereign decisions enters a different equation entirely.

This is why Algeria’s approach to Africa is structurally opposite: it bets on projects such as the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline and the African Energy Bank, whose value rises when neighbouring states stabilise. Turning those states into conflict arenas is a direct loss for Algerian security, trade, energy and borders.

The phrase “patience has limits” in March 2024 was the beginning of an ascending chronology. Two years later came the stronger line: “Wherever they set foot, blood flows.” Between them appeared the gold data, the expanded Sudan file, Chinese weapons, mercenary sanctions, the Colombian route, the $50 million Mali ransom, and the Financial Times synthesis of ports, mines, gold and security power.

The strength of Tebboune’s reading does not lie in the sharpness of his words, but in the fact that the geography he warned about in 2024 is the same geography that in 2026 became the stage for the heaviest international investigations into Emirati influence.

Mali: money and al-Qaeda.
Libya: weapons and Haftar.
Sudan: gold, weapons and mercenaries.
Dubai: the centre where trade, money, African wealth and elites meet.

Algeria’s position has been consistent from the start: no one buys the right to reshape its neighbourhood, and investment does not become a licence to interfere in the sovereignty of states. After the investigations, the chronology of Tebboune’s statements reads less as a bilateral quarrel and more as an early record of a wider battle over who holds the decision in Africa; the African state itself, or external capital when it turns from economic partner into a tool of influence.

Algeria Gate: In a striking development suggesting that the self-proclaimed businessman known as Ayoub Aissiou is in reality nothing more than a long-time secret agent of Israel, according to observers, can one explain the open emergence of the Zionist lobby in France with a petition signed by several activist figures from the so-called Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France (CRIF)?

This organisation has long influenced political decision-making in France and has become one of Israel’s most important tools for defending its interests and advancing its agenda.

What is particularly noteworthy is the publication of the petition on websites belonging to Vincent Bolloré’s empire, such as the newspaper Le JDD.

Even more surprising is the haste of the pro-Zionist imam of Tunisian origin, Hassan Chalghoumi, who is supported by the UAE, in declaring what he called his rejection of Spain’s extradition of the Algerian citizen Ayoub Issiou and in calling on the French authorities to intervene with Madrid to prevent the handover.

This raises the question: is Ayoub Aissiou a French citizen?

The traitor and mercenary Boualem Sansal has also entered the fray, signing the petition alongside a group of pro-Zionists linked to the Union of Jewish Students of France (UEJF). The petition is both ridiculous and revealing: it exposes Ayoub Issiou’s suspicious links to French, Israeli, Moroccan and Emirati intelligence services, while also highlighting other names active in Jewish associations with an extreme Zionist orientation, such as “Betar,” which also signed the petition.

As the decisive moment approaches in the case of the Algerian businessman Ayoub Issiou, who has been detained in Barcelona since 25 July on the basis of an international arrest warrant, the Israeli lobby in France, together with controversial French political and media figures, has mobilised to prevent his extradition to Algeria.

This move raises numerous questions about the alleged Algerian businessman’s ties to Israeli and Moroccan intelligence. Aissiou is being pursued by the Algerian judiciary in cases involving financial and commercial offences, including violations of legislation governing the movement of capital to and from abroad, illicit currency transfers, money laundering and the concealment of proceeds linked to corruption, among other charges.

What is striking is not only the nature of these moves, but also the identity of some of those involved and the way the case is being presented to European public opinion.

French novelist Pascal Bruckner, known for his strongly pro-Israel positions, has joined the campaign. He is joined by Boualem Sansal, convicted in Algeria on charges related to undermining national unity, and by the controversial Tunisian imam of Jewish origin, Hassan Chalghoumi.

Chalghoumi heads a French Islamic foundation supported by the UAE. He has previously visited Israel, where Israeli media photographed him embracing soldiers in Tel Aviv while claiming that the entity does not oppose Muslims.

Media support has also come from the outlets of French businessman Vincent Bolloré, whose platforms are steeped in narratives hostile to Algeria. The newspaper JDD, in particular, quickly published the alleged petition calling on French President Emmanuel Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez to intervene and prevent Aissiou’s extradition to Algeria.

Remarkably, this campaign seeks to reframe Aissiou as a “political opponent,” in an attempt to recharacterize the case away from its judicial core. The question that arises here is clear: are we dealing with a matter of freedom of opinion, or with a political attempt to reframe a judicial and financial file and give it a political cover?
According to the nature of the judicial files attributed to him, Aissiou is not a journalist imprisoned for an article, nor a writer pursued for a book, nor a political activist punished for his views. He is a businessman pursued in financial and economic cases; a fundamental difference that cannot be overlooked simply by applying the label of “political opponent.”

Even more questionable is the fact that the same circles that turned Boualem Sansal’s case into a symbolic battle under the banner of “freedom of expression” are now trying to apply the same logic to the case of a businessman.

This man has an economic trajectory and extensive networks of relationships.

The matter appears to go beyond mere humanitarian solidarity or legal defence. The political reframing of Issiou could have direct consequences for the course of his extradition, as well as for the Algerian judiciary’s ability to question him and investigate the files against him.

The man is not unknown within Algeria’s economic and media systems. His professional path brought him into contact with business circles and complex networks of influence in France and Morocco.

This is precisely what makes his file more sensitive, given the volume of information he may possess.

His return to Algeria could open the door to revealing precise details about money trails, companies and intermediaries, as well as the relationships of businessmen with political circles, and the protection and influence networks that accumulated privileges during the era of the “gang.” His statements could also help track capital flows and uncover relationships and interests that have remained in the shadows, and perhaps lift the veil on names and networks that targeted Algeria and extend into France and Morocco.

The fugitive businessman Ayoub Aissiou, who holds dual nationality (Liberian–Algerian), has for years posed as an Algerian businessman.

He transferred part of the funds he smuggled out of Algeria during the era of the “gang” to Morocco, seeking guarantees and protection from the Zionist lobby.

Aissiou, who is fleeing Algerian justice, knows full well that the Zionists control the Moroccan regime from top to bottom. He therefore planned to seek refuge in Morocco and settle there permanently, convinced that extradition to Algeria would be impossible.

This strategy followed the advice of his team of French lawyers, in exchange for transferring large sums of money from France to Morocco under the guise of investment, as Algeria Gate exclusively revealed in a series of earlier articles.

On this basis, according to a well-informed Algerian source, the plan of the Zionist-Moroccan lobby is to present Ayoub Aissiou as a businessman. In reality, he is a professional money-smuggler and launderer merely posing as one.

The Spanish judicial authorities can verify that none of the investment projects for which he obtained bank loans were ever completed. The funds have simply vanished to this day.

This applies whether to the project to rehabilitate the iron plant in M’Sila, the milk-production and cattle-import project in Djelfa, or the stone-fruit trees project in the same province.

The only projects that were partially completed were real-estate promotion apartments. These were distributed to a number of officials and their children, who later went to prison.