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Algeria Gate / Agencies: Through its complicity and turning a blind eye, the Makhzen is consolidating Morocco as a nurturing environment for secret laboratories producing hallucinogens and psychotropic substances, in a transition from a notable focus on the traditional hashish economy to the manufacture of chemical drugs and their smuggling across borders. Meanwhile, the activities of trafficking networks and the laundering of proceeds are expanding, turning the kingdom into a regional platform for manufacturing these poisons and flooding neighboring countries with them.

International data show that the shift is no longer limited to smuggling hard drugs but has extended to processing and converting them inside the kingdom. The Geneva-based international research network Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, which deals with cross-border organized crime and drug trafficking issues, highlighted the existence of a cocaine conversion laboratory in the city of Oujda, Morocco, since 2016, run by chemists and linked to the processing of 250 kilograms of refined cocaine that same year.

These facts expose Morocco’s central role, for years, in processing cocaine, and the appearance of locally manufactured substances shows the extent to which Moroccan criminal networks have developed their capabilities in this field.

In this regard, “boufa,” known as the “poor man’s cocaine,” has emerged as one of the most prominent manifestations of local manufacturing. It is a substance prepared from cocaine residues, chemicals, and drugs, and first appeared in Morocco in 2020 before expanding remarkably. However, “boufa” is only one face of a broader shift in the nature of drugs produced inside and outside the kingdom.

In January 2026, official data themselves acknowledged that more than four million psychotropic tablets were manufactured locally in a limited period inside secret laboratories, coinciding with the appearance of new psychotropic substances and the complexity of production networks and transit routes.

In this specific framework, Spanish investigations reveal that Moroccan manufacturing does not occur in isolation from abroad but relies on a cross-border network.

In January 2022, the Spanish police announced the dismantling of an international criminal network that was trafficking medicines used in the manufacture of what is known as the “Karkoubi” tablet inside Morocco (a type of psychotropic substance converted into hallucinogenic drugs). They seized 200,000 psychotropic tablets in Spain, while total seizures exceeded around 500,000 tablets as an extension of the same operation.

This case illustrates a broader meaning of the development of manufacturing inside the kingdom, as it reveals that some raw materials come from abroad as legitimate medicines before entering an illegal manufacturing process to produce hallucinogens inside Morocco.

Spanish public broadcaster RTVE clarified that “Karkoubi” is manufactured in Morocco using medicines coming from abroad, such as those related to epilepsy, before being transformed into a narcotic substance.

Thus, neighboring countries find themselves facing the repercussions of a criminal system that begins with obtaining pharmaceutical materials and ends with a dangerous drug manufactured in laboratories distributed across various cities of the kingdom, while the affected communities outside Morocco bear the high cost of the expansion of these networks.

The newspaper El País reinforces this picture in an investigation published in 2024 on Rivotril (a pharmaceutical substance for treating epilepsy and panic), highlighting that Spain sells nearly four million boxes annually and that a large part of these quantities ends up in illegal channels before the drug is used in preparing “Karkoubi” in Morocco.

The newspaper also cited Spanish police estimates speaking of profits exceeding 100 million euros annually achieved by organized Moroccan criminal groups from this activity.

Here appears the capacity of the criminal economy to convert a legitimately available pharmaceutical substance into a source of financing for a drug trade that extends outside the kingdom.

These networks do not stop at a single path, as European investigations reveal the extension of their activity linked to Morocco through multiple routes. In June 2025, Spanish police dismantled a network operating between Morocco and Spain and seized a huge quantity of one of the most dangerous types of hallucinogens, the “clonazepam” tablet, along with 22 kilograms of hashish.

Algeria Gate: In a resounding media revelation, the Spanish press exploded a spying scandal that shook the capital Madrid, after publishing reports based on documents from the Spanish National Intelligence Center (CNI) that expose the scale of the Moroccan spy network operating on its territory.

Moroccan intelligence activity in Spain is no longer merely an “open secret” aimed at tracking sensitive files such as politics, security, regional tensions, and economic relations with the European Union; today, thanks to what Spanish media have revealed, it has become a documented reality with figures and names.

Press and security reports confirmed that Rabat has deployed around 600 agents in Spain in recent years, a figure that jumps to 900 agents during periods of maximum tension between the two countries. These resounding leaks of Moroccan intelligence operations data come after Moroccan agents in civilian clothes were observed coordinating the recent assault operations on the city of Ceuta.

Details of the biggest leak: Hacking Hamouchi’s agencies

According to what Spanish newspapers published, Madrid’s intelligence services prepared a detailed document containing the full names of 600 Moroccan agents with precise monitoring of their movements inside Spain. The roots of this information go back to a massive cyber breach targeting the two Moroccan intelligence agencies last August.

A hacker calling himself “Jabaroot” published four leaked “Excel” files containing 70,381 names believed to belong to members of the General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (internal intelligence) and the General Directorate for Studies and Documents (external intelligence), both agencies run by Abdelatif Hamouchi.

Spanish agents analyzed the data published via the Telegram platform and confirmed its complete credibility. Although the identities of 600 agents were identified, sources indicate that they are not all currently present in Spain; some later became sources of information for Spanish intelligence itself.

Map of deployment and diplomatic cover

The Moroccan intelligence network uses diplomatic cover as a primary façade for its movements; between 15 and 20 names are directly linked to Rabat’s embassy in Madrid, and their identities appear on the list of the consular corps accredited to the Spanish Foreign Ministry.

Intelligence presence is not limited to the capital but extends to areas with high concentrations of Moroccan immigrants such as Algeciras, Catalonia, and Valencia, as well as strategic and sensitive points such as Bilbao and Las Palmas. Although the use of embassies and minor attaché posts as cover for movement with diplomatic passports is a common global practice, deploying hundreds of agents in a neighboring country raises sharp questions, especially in light of Spanish diplomatic statements describing Morocco as a “friendly country.”

The Ceuta crisis and the counter-intelligence war

These leaks, extensively covered by the Spanish press, came at the height of the clash between the two countries, specifically after the illegal entry of around 80,000 people into Ceuta via the Tarajal beach border.

The estimates of 600 to 900 Moroccan agents deployed in Spain take on double seriousness after a Spanish National Police report indicated the involvement of gendarmerie elements and Moroccan agents in civilian clothes in coordinating this invasion.

For its part, Spain also maintains elements of the Intelligence Center (CNI) inside Morocco, whose work focuses mainly on combating illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and terrorism. In the context of the Ceuta crisis, Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles revealed in late August the presence of 25 Spanish agents in the city, defending their role by saying they had sent prior warnings of a “human invasion” in late July, which contradicted the Spanish government’s official narrative at the time.

The leak of the 70,000 names was accompanied by a message that these data were a “gift” to Spain. While fingers initially pointed toward Algeria, this hypothesis later faded in favor of independent investigations that located “Jabaroot” in Germany.

Intelligence estimates, given the scale and precision of the breach, point to the involvement of former Moroccan agents in the operation. The name of Mehdi El Hajjaoui stands out here; the former number-two man in Moroccan intelligence, who fled his country years ago and settled in Spain.

The story takes on a Hollywood dimension: El Hajjaoui, who also holds German nationality (which explains his link to the August leaks from Germany), is wanted under an Interpol arrest warrant. Although Spanish intelligence located him and began extradition procedures to Morocco, he suddenly disappeared the second time the authorities tried to arrest him.

Today, Morocco is searching for him across half the globe without requesting official Spanish assistance, while his former colleagues, according to what Spanish media have published, believe he is living undercover in one of the towns south of Madrid under the protection of Spanish intelligence.

Algeria Gate: In one of the most dangerous cyber blows that threatens a knockout punch to the throne of Mohammed VI, the Israeli Pegasus program; through which the Moroccan Makhzen regime excelled at spying on and blackmailing heavyweight foreign officials and politicians, has today become a spell that has turned against its caster.

The Spanish newspaper ABC revealed that Mehdi El Hajjaoui, considered the most dangerous Moroccan intelligence fugitive, is the engineer of the spying operations on the phone of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, confirming that he is ready to empty its sensitive contents.

The former deputy head of the Moroccan foreign intelligence service, according to the same source, was the leader of the spying operations carried out via the Pegasus program. Shortly before leaving Morocco in 2024, Mehdi El Hajjaoui stole all the information related to the infection of government phones. Sources close to him told ABC that “he is the one who infected Pedro Sánchez’s phone” and that he is “ready to provide” all the information about the breach: “how it was done, who was targeted, the content of the phone and the 2.6 gigabytes.”

El Hajjaoui, who was a general advisor in the Moroccan foreign intelligence service, fled Morocco in 2024 carrying with him other sensitive information about King Mohammed VI’s system: disclosures about the king, intelligence officials, ministers, security leaders, bribes to European parliamentarians in the “Moroccogate” case, and spying operations on European leaders such as Sánchez and French President Emmanuel Macron using the Israeli program.

The exclusive document obtained by ABC, which El Hajjaoui deposited with trusted people who helped him escape from Spain in February 2025, confirms that he led a secret operations unit specialized in cyber-spying on leaders in Europe and Africa, through which the Pegasus operations were carried out.

Mehdi El Hajjaoui: A mobile time bomb

His service record, according to the same source, specifies his high-level missions: “Head of the Security Office. Commander of the Atlas Unit and the Action Service Training Center, and charged with the mission before the Director General.” This points to Yassine Mansouri, head of foreign intelligence, who led the spying operations on politicians, journalists, and international leaders between 2020 and 2022 with the aim of imposing an international change in the status of Western Sahara and emptying the United Nations mission (MINURSO) of its substance.

El Hajjaoui was responsible for training agents for these secret operations and was also commander of the Atlas Unit (the elite of the Moroccan armed forces known as the “Atlas Shooters”). The same sources say: “Everything passed through his hands… He was the general controller of Moroccan intelligence, and he is now a mobile bomb.”

The document shows his long career in the intelligence service until his flight in 2024. He worked as a mission officer with the advisor close to King Mohammed VI, Fouad Ali El Himma. His service record covers 20 years as a “senior intelligence officer” in the foreign intelligence service (1994–2014), where he reached the position of “general controller” and even temporarily replaced the Director General during a sick leave.

The documents refute the Moroccan smear campaign that tried to portray him as a mere ordinary criminal and “swindler” claiming to be a high-level spy. El Hajjaoui, aged 53, was born in Hamburg, Germany, and is characterized by a strong build. He trained with the intelligence services of several countries: Mossad (Israel) and the CIA (United States), in addition to courses in the United States, Canada, France, Belgium, England, and Israel.

El Hajjaoui also studied in Paris advanced courses in intelligence, influence strategies, psychological warfare, and cybersecurity at the School of Economic Warfare. After fleeing Morocco, he first settled in France, but discovered he was being monitored by Moroccan agents, so he moved to Spain. His entourage says that the Spanish CNI set a trap for him in a meeting attended by two Moroccan agents who tried to persuade him to return, but he never trusted Spanish intelligence because of “the Spanish government’s subordination to Morocco.” CNI sources only confirm that he has been “in an unknown location” since February 2025.

His lifeline: Pegasus

The former number-two man in Moroccan intelligence fled Spain carrying with him a “lifeline”: all the information about the infection of Sánchez’s phone with Pegasus, in exchange for the suspension of the extradition procedures initiated by the Spanish National Court on the basis of an Interpol warrant.

ABC confirms that the information he can provide is extremely sensitive and will confirm Morocco’s responsibility for infecting the phones of Pedro Sánchez (2.6 gigabytes), Defense Minister Margarita Robles, Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska, Agriculture Minister Luis Planas, and former Foreign Minister Arancha González Laya.

The infection of González Laya’s phone occurred in the same month that she informed Sánchez of the decision to receive Polisario leader Brahim Ghali in Spain for humanitarian reasons. A few days later came the assault on Ceuta in May 2021.

El Hajjaoui wants to reveal “how the spying was done and who was targeted” even more than the content of the data, in order to expose Moroccan operations of major international dimensions. After the spying, Sánchez paid a heavy price: the dismissal of González Laya at Morocco’s explicit request, blackmail with migration in 2021, then Spain’s historic shift in its position on Western Sahara.