Algeria Gate: The latest issue of the Official Gazette published the presidential decree creating the “Algeria Prize for the Eternal Prophetic Sira,” an award established by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune to encourage people of all ages to memorize and understand the Prophet’s hadiths.

The prize also aims to highlight the importance that the Algerian state and society attach to the Prophetic Sira and the hadith.

According to the decree, the distinction will be awarded to winners of several competitions devoted to the Sira of the Prophet Muhammad. These include an annual national competition for young memorizers, an annual national competition for hadith memorization, and an international competition held every three years.

The awards ceremony will take place during the National Week of the Prophetic Sira, organized in the month of Muharram.

For young participants who have memorized 100 hadiths along with knowledge of their narrators, the prizes are 500,000 DA for first place, 350,000 DA for second, and 200,000 DA for third.

For adults who have memorized 400 hadiths with their narrators, the national competition prizes are 1 million DA, 750,000 DA, and 500,000 DA for the top three.

At the international level, the awards reach 3.25 million DA for the first-place winner, 2.5 million DA for second, and 1.5 million DA for third.

The juries will be composed of national and international experts selected from among researchers specializing in hadith and the Prophetic Sira. The list of members will be set by decision of the minister responsible for Religious Affairs.

Ammar Belani dismantles the diplomacy of barter: Rabat sold Palestine for a fragile presidential recognition, while Abu Dhabi tied its military and digital ambitions to Washington’s keys.

Algeria Gate: The Abraham Accords did not create balanced alliances so much as a political marketplace in which Arab normalization with Israel was traded for carefully calculated American privileges. Morocco exchanged the resumption of ties with Tel Aviv for U.S. presidential recognition of its claimed sovereignty over Western Sahara. The UAE bet on access to American arms vaults, F-35 fighters, AI chips, and dual-use technologies.

What Rabat and Abu Dhabi marketed as a strategic breakthrough lacks real immunity. Morocco’s recognition never became binding federal law. The UAE’s fighter deal stalled when the administration changed. Advanced chips remain subject to licenses Washington can expand or restrict at will.

The Accords granted no permanent sovereign guarantees. They tied the two countries’ gains to the White House, Congress, American national-security needs, and Israel’s interests. Protecting those gains requires constant renewal of the political, security, and economic quid pro quo, turning a one-time deal into an open-ended invoice.

This is the conclusion of former Algerian diplomat Ammar Belani. In his reading, these are not institutionally protected alliances but executive and personal arrangements linked to Donald Trump that any later administration can revise, reduce, or reprice.

Rabat Sold the Principle and Bought a Declaration

In December 2020, the resumption of official Moroccan-Israeli relations coincided with Trump’s Presidential Proclamation 10126 recognizing Moroccan claims over Western Sahara. The recognition was the direct price for joining normalization.

Rabat presented it domestically as a historic settlement while concealing its institutional fragility. Issued by proclamation rather than congressional legislation, it remains open to executive revision. Even a renewed Trump stance does not convert it into a permanent legal commitment.

Morocco gained an important political position but no legal instrument that ends the conflict or alters the territory’s international status. Western Sahara remains on the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, and the Sahrawi right to self-determination continues to appear in Security Council resolutions. Resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025 reaffirmed the need for a just, lasting, mutually acceptable solution based on self-determination. The White House can offer political support; it cannot erase a decolonization file or turn occupation into completed legal sovereignty.

Morocco therefore purchased a revisable recognition at a heavy political and moral cost; normalizing with Israel while King Mohammed VI chaired the Al-Quds Committee and turning the Palestinian cause into a bargaining chip. Naming a road to occupied Dakhla after Trump adds symbolism but no legislative immunity or standing in international law.

A Recognition That Requires Continuous Installments

Belani argues the deeper problem is the ongoing cost of protecting the recognition. Rabat cannot simply rest on the 2020 deal; it must continually prove its usefulness to American and Israeli strategy.

Hence Morocco offers its location, facilities, and resources; military and security cooperation, phosphates, strategic minerals, green hydrogen, Tanger Med logistics, and West African positioning. Greater fear of a recognition retreat increases the pressure to present itself as a ready Western platform.

The relationship is clearly unequal. Washington decides the value of the Moroccan contribution; Rabat bears the burden of maintaining and expanding normalization even when it becomes a domestic liability before a public that rejects the war on Gaza.

Normalization placed Morocco inside a soft circle of blackmail: protecting the gain requires paying more; each change of administration demands fresh proof of loyalty and utility.

“Freeze” for Public Consumption and Deals Under the Table

Official talk of cooling or freezing normalization managed popular anger. Diplomatic visibility declined, but military and security cooperation expanded.

SIPRI data show Israel became Morocco’s third-largest arms supplier in 2020–2024, with roughly 11 percent of imports after the United States and France. Cooperation also includes a near-billion-dollar Ofek-13 reconnaissance satellite and the 2021 defense agreement covering intelligence exchange, procurement, and military industries. These interests continued while official voices spoke of a political “freeze.”

Rabat used calming language for domestic consumption while keeping military doors open. The gap was visible during Israeli Transport Minister Miri Regev’s visit: protests erupted, and authorities quickly labeled the trip private. Changing protocol does not erase the political meaning of hosting an official linked to extreme rhetoric toward Palestinians.

It is two-faced diplomacy: calculated discourse for the street, calculated cooperation for the agencies. Credibility erodes when a state retains the Al-Quds Committee chairmanship while deepening its military partnership with Israel.

The UAE Bought a Promise, Not Fighters

Abu Dhabi sought to upgrade its military and technological position rather than resolve a territorial dispute. After normalization, the Trump administration notified Congress in November 2020 of a potential $23.4 billion package including up to 50 F-35s, 18 MQ-9 drones, and advanced munitions.

The transfer of power showed Abu Dhabi had obtained only initial political approval. The deal was reviewed; talks were suspended at the end of 2021 over American conditions, technology-security concerns, Israel’s qualitative edge, and UAE-China relations.

The Accords did not hand the UAE the F-35 key; they placed it before a door Washington controls and Israel can effectively block. Abu Dhabi normalizes and invests, yet the final decision remains American.

The Chip Bet Under American Supervision

After the F-35 setback, the UAE shifted focus to artificial intelligence and large data centers. That ambition depends on advanced American chips it neither produces nor controls.

In July 2026 Washington eased some export restrictions on AI chips, military equipment, commercial satellites, and dual-use technologies. The wider access remains subject to regulatory change. Concerns about technology leaking to China ensure every Emirati AI expansion faces American scrutiny over ownership, partners, data security, and final destinations.

Dependency simply moved from a fighter that never arrived to a chip that can be halted. Mechanisms linking large processor volumes to reciprocal U.S. investment and non-transfer guarantees further condition Abu Dhabi’s digital ambitions on American rules.

Washington Collects the Price and Retains the Veto

The 2006 Dubai Ports World episode showed that White House proximity offers no protection when Congress invokes national security. Privileges tied to a president’s person and circle become more vulnerable when power or majorities change.

Reports of dealings linked to the Trump family’s economic circle have fueled conflict-of-interest debates, making advanced-weapons or strategic-chip privileges especially open to re-examination.

Washington gains in every scenario: normalization, arms sales, investment, guarantees, technology monitoring, and the right to suspend or rewrite terms. The Arab side pays first and waits for delivery later.

Michigan Breaks the Aura of AIPAC

Fragility extends to shifting American politics on Israel. Long low-cost electoral support is becoming a point of Democratic division and a potential liability for some Republicans.

In the August 2026 Michigan Democratic Senate primary, Abdel-Fattah al-Sayyid won the nomination despite nearly $30 million in AIPAC and affiliated spending; the group’s largest single-race investment, plus tens of millions more from outside groups. Financial superiority did not decide the outcome.

The defeat does not end the lobby’s influence, but it ends the myth that its money always buys results. Open association can become a liability in states with significant Arab and Muslim communities and younger voters angry over Gaza. Even allies of Republican Mike Rogers reportedly sought to limit public AIPAC support for fear of political cost.

Widening Democratic division over Israel aid and the Gaza war means normalization-linked privileges face higher scrutiny and higher congressional cost.

November 2026 Begins the Reckoning

The November 2026 midterms will test the durability of what Morocco and the UAE obtained. A more oversight-minded Congress could expand reviews of arms deals, chip licenses, and advanced technology, and reopen the Western Sahara proclamation as a non-legislative act.

For the UAE the risk is immediate in dual-use technology, AI, and advanced weapons. For Morocco the sharper question is what remains if the president changes: recognition rests with the executive, the UN status of Western Sahara endures, and Rabat must keep proving its usefulness.

January 2029, the end of Trump’s term, will test whether the privileges survive without their original sponsor. A new president can revisit the proclamation, alter chip-export rules, or add military conditions. Neither capital can prevent it; both accepted building gains on an American decision they do not control.

A Deal Whose Key the Americans Hold

Belani concludes that Morocco and the UAE obtained real privileges but no permanent guarantees. Rabat holds a presidential recognition that does not cancel Western Sahara’s international legal status. Abu Dhabi enjoys wider access to weapons and chips, still contingent on American licenses and guarantees.

The Accords function as a contract the American side can interpret and amend. Israel receives normalization and security cooperation; the United States receives investment, markets, and influence; the Arab partners bear internal and moral costs while continually proving eligibility.

Morocco’s price was heavier: it placed Palestine on the scales of barter for a recognition that cannot change a single UN decision, expanded military ties with Israel, and used “freeze” rhetoric to calm a public that rejects turning the Al-Quds Committee chairmanship into cover for partnership with the occupation.

The UAE moved from chasing a stealth aircraft to chasing chips; in both cases the technology stayed behind an American door. Every advance requires Washington’s approval and faces tests involving China, Israel’s edge, and U.S. national security.

The Accords sold the illusion of permanent privilege and delivered membership in a renewable system of dependency. Normalization was delivered, the Arab price paid, while the gains remained deferred, conditional, or revocable.

November 2026 will set the new price Washington demands. January 2029 will show whether the two capitals obtained strategic partnerships or merely temporary promises that expire when their sponsor leaves the White House.

Until then Morocco continues paying to protect a recognition without legal immunity, and the UAE invests to protect a chip flow it does not control. Palestine, used as the bridge to these privileges, remains the starkest witness to a deal in which the stronger party secured every guarantee while the Arab side paid before verifying the goods would last.

From the alleged “biggest blow to Moroccan intelligence” to threats over the Ceuta events, the scandal is exposing vulnerabilities that Rabat can no longer easily conceal.

Algeria Gate: What the JabaROOT group claims to have achieved is far more damaging to Morocco than an ordinary cyberattack. The group says it has published data on more than 70,000 people allegedly linked to Moroccan security and intelligence services, while threatening to reveal officials it claims were involved in planning and coordinating the events surrounding Ceuta.

The full authenticity and scope of the files still require independent technical verification. But the allegations have already triggered intense interest in the Spanish press, because they strike at the heart of Morocco’s security establishment and raise uncomfortable questions about Rabat’s activities inside Europe.

According to Spanish reports, the leaked material allegedly includes names, positions, dates of birth, identity numbers, ranks, recruitment dates and, in some cases, banking information. If confirmed, this would be much more than an embarrassing data breach: it could expose the structure, networks and operating methods of key Moroccan security institutions.

The affair is particularly sensitive because the alleged targets include personnel linked to the General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance (DGST) and the General Directorate for National Security (DGSN), both headed by Abdellatif Hammouchi.

From Moroccan Cyberattack to Spanish Security Concern

Spanish newspaper ABC described the development as a new escalation in the cyberwar surrounding Morocco. It reported that JabaROOT had published a database containing tens of thousands of alleged members of Moroccan intelligence and police services.

But the most explosive element is the group’s threat to publish the names of those it claims coordinated the Ceuta operation.

The group has also accused senior figures close to the Moroccan royal palace of involvement in planning actions designed to put Spain under pressure. Among the names mentioned is Fouad Ali El Himma, a powerful adviser to King Mohammed VI. At the same time, the group reportedly excluded the king himself from prior knowledge of the alleged operation, directing the accusations instead toward figures surrounding the palace.

The Objective went further, reporting that the group claimed to have exposed 70,381 presumed agents, including senior intelligence officials, alongside sensitive information contained in several electronic files.

Meanwhile, El Confidencial described the episode as potentially “the biggest blow ever dealt to Moroccan intelligence.” Previous leaks attributed to JabaROOT reportedly contained accurate information, although that does not by itself establish the authenticity of every newly published file.

Ceuta: The Most Dangerous Part of the Story

The Ceuta dimension is what turns the scandal into a potentially explosive Spanish-Moroccan affair.

JabaROOT claims that the mass movement of Moroccans toward Ceuta was not simply the result of uncontrolled migration or a temporary failure of border management, but part of a broader operation allegedly prepared inside Morocco.

The group has threatened to publish the identities of Moroccan security personnel it says coordinated the operation, as well as alleged mission orders concerning agents who moved to Fnideq before and during the events.

If those documents are independently authenticated, the consequences would be enormous. Spain would not merely be confronting another Moroccan data breach; it would have to confront allegations that its own border environment was deliberately used as a tool of political pressure.

That raises a question Madrid has long preferred to handle cautiously: can Spain continue to rely so heavily on Morocco to manage migration and border security while ignoring the leverage that dependence gives Rabat?

The alleged leak does not, by itself, prove that Morocco orchestrated the events. But it has reopened precisely the question that the Spanish authorities would rather keep closed.

The “Impenetrable” Moroccan Security Machine Takes a Hit

For years, Rabat has carefully cultivated the image of an exceptionally capable security apparatus; one that Europe relies upon in the fight against terrorism, organized crime and irregular migration.

The JabaROOT affair strikes directly at that image.

If tens of thousands of sensitive records really escaped from Morocco’s security institutions, the damage would extend well beyond exposed names. Intelligence structures, recruitment networks, administrative links and operational relationships could potentially be compromised.

The Objective characterized the alleged breach as deep and extensive, while highlighting the appearance of information concerning senior security officials.

Still, Spanish reporting has also exercised some caution. Being listed in a security database does not automatically make someone an intelligence operative, and the publication of a genuine sample does not prove that the entire database of 70,000 names is authentic.

But that distinction does little to erase the central problem: someone appears to have obtained and published sensitive information connected to the Moroccan security apparatus.

And Rabat has yet to provide a convincing public explanation that settles the question of how such information could have escaped.

From Pegasus to JabaROOT

The scandal also inevitably revives the Pegasus affair.

Spanish authorities previously confirmed that the phones of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and senior ministers had been compromised by Pegasus spyware. Although Morocco denied involvement and Spanish investigations have not established judicially that Rabat was responsible, suspicions surrounding the affair never fully disappeared.

The JabaROOT allegations do not prove Morocco’s involvement in Pegasus either. But by bringing espionage, surveillance and Moroccan intelligence activity back into the Spanish media spotlight, they have reopened an old political wound.

The stakes go beyond personal privacy. Any evidence of foreign intelligence operations inside Spain would inevitably raise questions about sensitive files such as Western Sahara, Ceuta, Melilla, migration and Madrid’s relations with Rabat.

An attempt to export the accusation toward Algeria

Faced with the leaks, Moroccan authorities have reportedly sought to attribute JabaROOT’s activities to Algeria, continuing a familiar pattern in which Rabat attempts to externalize damaging security crises.

Spanish media, however, have not treated that claim as established fact.

Reports citing cybersecurity specialists and intelligence sources have raised doubts about the Algerian hypothesis and pointed instead to the possibility of an insider with knowledge of Morocco’s security system, or even an internal struggle within the apparatus.

That uncertainty matters.

Instead of shifting the spotlight toward Algeria, the accusations have left the more uncomfortable question unanswered: how did such sensitive information allegedly escape Morocco’s most powerful security institutions in the first place?

The burden of proof remains with those making the accusation.

A Crisis of Confidence for Morocco

The real damage to Morocco may therefore extend far beyond the leaked files.

For years, Rabat has presented itself to Europe as an indispensable security partner and a reliable gatekeeper against migration and terrorism. But the JabaROOT affair is putting another image before European audiences: that of a security system allegedly vulnerable to major internal penetration and accused of conducting controversial activities beyond Morocco’s borders.

Not every allegation made by JabaROOT has been proven. But the scandal has already achieved something significant: it has placed Morocco’s intelligence apparatus under an unusually intense European microscope.

If the documents concerning Ceuta are authenticated, Spain could face evidence of an extraordinary attempt to use security and migration pressure against its own territory. If they are not, the scale of the alleged breach would still expose serious questions about the protection of Moroccan security data.

Either way, Rabat faces a difficult problem.

The issue is no longer simply whether 70,000 names were leaked. It is whether Morocco can still maintain the image of an impenetrable security apparatus while its alleged internal data, intelligence networks and cross-border activities are being dragged into the public arena.

And that may be the most damaging part of the JabaROOT affair: the scandal has moved from Moroccan servers to the heart of the European debate over trust in Rabat.