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Algeria Reorders Its African Strategic Depth: Mali Reopens the Path as Niger and Chad Help Shape a New Sahel Economy

• Author: Lys Iwannughen • 0 comments • 79 views
Algeria Reorders Its African Strategic Depth: Mali Reopens the Path as Niger and Chad Help Shape a New Sahel Economy

Abdoulaye Maiga’s visit to Algeria is far more than a diplomatic thaw. It is another piece in a broader Algerian strategy to rebuild its strategic depth in the Sahel; one that brings together security, energy, development, and sovereignty while pushing back against the logic of foreign interference.

Algeria Gate: President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is waging one of Algeria’s most consequential national-security battles without falling into the trap of open confrontation or an expensive race for regional influence. Instead, Algiers is relying on pragmatism: repairing what political tensions had damaged with Mali, deepening solidarity with Niger and Chad, and transforming that solidarity into concrete energy and development partnerships.

Rather than waiting for instability to reach Algeria’s southern borders, Algiers is moving the defensive line forward; toward the spaces where insecurity, institutional fragility, terrorism, trafficking, and foreign interference take root.

The visit of Mali’s Prime Minister and Head of Government, Abdoulaye Maiga, to Algiers on August 24, 2026, therefore carries a significance that goes well beyond the restoration of bilateral contacts. It completes an essential political and security component of Algeria’s wider Sahel strategy.

Mali is the sensitive western gateway. Niger occupies the center of the region’s security and energy equation. Chad provides an eastern extension toward Libya, Sudan, and Central Africa.

But Algeria is not attempting to build this strategic depth through military bases, political tutelage, or imposed alliances. Its tools are different: dialogue, respect for sovereignty, institutional support, technical expertise, infrastructure, energy, and training.

The message is increasingly clear: Algeria wants a Sahel that is stronger, more sovereign, and less vulnerable to external manipulation.

The 40-megawatt power project in Niger, the similar project launched in Chad, and the renewed political channel with Bamako all point in the same direction. Energy and development are no longer peripheral to Algeria’s security doctrine. They are becoming instruments of it.

Algeria Reorders Its African Strategic Depth: Mali Reopens the Path as Niger and Chad Help Shape a New Sahel Economy

For Algiers, the countries of the Sahel are not a buffer separating Algeria from danger. They are the first line of stability from which Algeria’s own security begins.

The real question is whether Tebboune can turn a region long treated as a belt of crises into a strategic depth capable of protecting Algeria, strengthening its neighbors, and reshaping its economic position in Africa.

Mali’s Return Reopens Algeria’s Sahelian Depth

The significance of Mali’s return becomes even clearer when viewed alongside Algeria’s expanding cooperation with Niger and Chad.

These are not isolated bilateral files. Together, they reveal a broader conception of the Sahel as an interconnected strategic space.

Mali represents Algeria’s most sensitive western gateway. Niger sits at the crossroads of security, energy, and geo-economic interests. Chad extends the strategic horizon eastward toward Libya, Sudan, and Central Africa.

Geography makes this approach unavoidable.

With its enormous southern territory and vast desert borders, Algeria cannot separate its domestic security from developments unfolding across the Sahel. Instability does not respect frontiers. Terrorism, weapons trafficking, organized crime, human trafficking, irregular migration, and disruptions to trade can quickly cross borders and turn local crises into regional threats.

But geography is only part of the equation. The future is becoming equally decisive.

The Sahel is facing rapid population growth, climate pressure, economic hardship, energy shortages, infrastructure deficits, and a lack of employment opportunities. At the same time, regional and global powers are competing aggressively for resources, markets, strategic corridors, and political influence.

That reality makes border security alone insufficient.

By the time a crisis reaches Algeria’s frontier, the cost of containing it is already high. Preventing instability at its source is far more strategic, and far less costly.

This is why Algeria’s understanding of national security is expanding. Security increasingly means helping neighboring states control their territories, strengthen their institutions, secure their resources, and create the minimum conditions necessary for economic and social stability.

Algeria’s strategic depth is therefore not about creating satellites or imposing a sphere of influence. It is about constructing a neighborhood in which interests are sufficiently intertwined that the stability of the Sahel becomes inseparable from Algeria’s own security.

Algeria’s Security Begins Before the Border

This is where Algeria’s approach sharply differs from the interventionist models that have repeatedly failed across Africa.

Algiers is not seeking to dictate political choices to its neighbors. It is betting on their ability to stand on their own feet.

Training personnel, transferring technical expertise, strengthening institutions, supporting civilian and military capabilities, and helping states develop their own infrastructure all serve the same objective: reducing institutional fragility and protecting independent national decision-making.

That approach has become even more important as the number of actors operating across the Sahel continues to grow.

Armed groups, trafficking networks, organized crime, private military companies, foreign powers, and cross-border economic interests all exploit institutional vacuums. The weaker the state, the wider the space available for penetration and manipulation.

For Algeria, strengthening the sovereignty of Sahelian states is therefore not simply a matter of diplomatic principle. It is a direct national-security interest.

Algiers does not need dependent neighbors. It needs strong neighbors; states capable of controlling their territory, defending their institutions, protecting their resources, and making independent decisions.

That is why empowerment is ultimately more durable than political influence. A country with functioning institutions and qualified human resources is harder to manipulate and less vulnerable to foreign dependency.

Algeria’s rejection of attempts to exploit the fragility of Sahelian states to impose political or security choices from abroad fits squarely into this strategy.

The weaker state institutions become, the more room armed groups, criminal networks, and foreign actors have to operate. The stronger those institutions become, the narrower that space becomes.

Three Imperatives Shape the Relationship

Professor Briche Abdelkader, an economic expert specializing in geopolitical and geo-economic affairs, places the renewed Algerian-Malian relationship and Algeria’s growing partnerships with Niger and Chad within three interconnected imperatives: history, geography, and the future.

His assessment is compelling.

Despite their different political and economic circumstances, Mali, Niger, and Chad form essential components of Algeria’s strategic environment. But building that depth does not require guardianship. It requires expanding the circle of stability, sovereignty, and shared interests.

The logic is straightforward: the more stable these countries become, the more secure Algeria becomes.

Historical ties and border continuity give the relationship with Mali particular weight. Niger occupies a central position in Algeria’s energy and geo-economic calculations. Chad opens an eastern corridor toward Libya, Sudan, and Central Africa.

Their differences do not weaken the strategy. They make it more flexible.

Algeria can adapt its tools to each country while maintaining the same principles: good-neighborliness, respect for sovereignty, non-interference, dialogue, and support for political solutions.

Briche is right to distinguish between influence and empowerment. Algeria does not need a neighborhood dependent on it. It needs a neighborhood capable of defending itself.

And this is where Algeria’s approach becomes particularly interesting: political and security cooperation is increasingly being reinforced by economic diplomacy.

The transition is underway; from solidarity as a principle to solidarity as an investment.

Electricity Turns Solidarity into Strategic Investment

The Algerian-Nigerien Solidarity Power Plant in Niamey is perhaps the clearest example.

Algeria completed the Gouro Banda plant, with a capacity of 40 megawatts, and inaugurated it on June 3, 2026, as an Algerian gift to Niger.

Algeria Reorders Its African Strategic Depth: Mali Reopens the Path as Niger and Chad Help Shape a New Sahel Economy

Its importance goes beyond the electricity it generates.

The project marked the first major energy achievement carried out by Sonelgaz International, giving it a double strategic value: strengthening Niger’s energy security while establishing Algerian technical expertise and companies more firmly in the African market.

In Chad, the same approach is taking shape.

An agreement was signed for the construction of a 40-megawatt power plant in N’Djamena, followed by the laying of its foundation stone in June 2026. The project also includes the transfer of Algerian expertise and the training of Chadian personnel in plant operation and network management.

This distinction matters.

Algeria is not merely delivering infrastructure and leaving. It is helping create the human and technical capacity needed to operate and maintain it.

In countries where energy access remains weak, electricity is not simply another public service. It is the foundation for industry, investment, healthcare, education, communications, public services, and economic activity.

Every additional megawatt can expand productive capacity and make previously impossible investments viable.

This makes energy diplomacy a security instrument.

Infrastructure reduces vulnerability. Employment reduces the social space exploited by extremist and criminal networks. Stronger public services reinforce the presence of the state.

A power plant, a transmission network, or a technical training program can therefore have consequences far beyond the energy sector.

At the same time, Algeria is not sacrificing its own economic interests.

The expansion of Sonelgaz International into Niger and Chad gives Algerian engineering and energy companies access to markets that desperately need power generation, distribution, maintenance, training, and renewable-energy solutions.

That can eventually create opportunities for other Algerian companies in construction, public works, transport, communications, banking, and logistics.

This is where solidarity becomes strategic economic policy.

Temporary aid can alleviate an immediate crisis. Infrastructure, training, investment, and trade create relationships that can survive political changes.

From Lines of Risk to Corridors of Value

The next step is even more ambitious: transforming Algeria’s southern borders from lines of security surveillance into corridors of economic value.

Algeria possesses geography, energy resources, engineering expertise, technical capacity, roads, and infrastructure. The Sahel possesses natural resources, expanding markets, and enormous demand for energy, transport, telecommunications, logistics, and services.

The opportunity is obvious.

Connect roads to trade corridors. Connect energy to industry. Connect telecommunications to markets. Connect logistics to border commerce.

If Algeria succeeds in doing this, the southern border will no longer be viewed primarily as a frontier exposed to risk. It can become a gateway into Africa.

Algeria can position itself as a northern platform for goods, services, investment, and expertise flowing toward the Sahel, while its southern partners gain access to Mediterranean markets and a stronger industrial and energy ecosystem.

The security dividends could be just as significant as the economic ones.

The more capable Sahelian states become of generating electricity, building infrastructure, creating employment, controlling their territories, and strengthening institutions, the fewer spaces remain for extremist organizations, trafficking networks, and foreign actors seeking to exploit instability.

Economic cooperation, in this context, is not separate from geopolitics. It is geopolitics.

What Algeria is gradually building is therefore more than a collection of infrastructure projects. It is the embryo of a geo-economic space connecting North Africa with the Sahel.

To make it work, however, Algiers will have to move beyond isolated projects and create an integrated regional strategy covering diplomacy, security, investment, energy, training, transportation, financing, insurance, and border trade.

The potential is enormous. But so is the competition.

Mali Completes the Strategic Picture

This is why Abdoulaye Maiga’s visit matters.

It is not simply a diplomatic reset between Algiers and Bamako. It restores a political pillar that Algeria needs if its broader Sahel strategy is to have real coherence.

Niger and Chad have already provided concrete examples of what Algeria calls developmental and energy diplomacy.

Mali brings the most sensitive geopolitical dimension.

Algeria’s objective is not to create a dependent neighborhood. It is to help build a neighborhood strong enough to defend its own sovereignty and prevent its territory from becoming a launchpad for threats or a playground for rival foreign powers.

That distinction is crucial.

Strategic depth should not be measured by how much influence Algeria can impose. It should be measured by how much stability it can help generate.

History binds Algeria to the Sahel. Geography makes the region’s security inseparable from Algeria’s own. The future demands a new model.

In that model, political mediation goes hand in hand with electricity. Border security is reinforced by roads. Solidarity evolves into investment. Training becomes a tool of sovereignty.

The return of Mali and the expanding partnerships with Niger and Chad therefore point toward a single strategic project: a more stable Sahel, stronger sovereign states, and an Algerian South surrounded by development partnerships rather than belts of crisis.

#Algeria#Chad#Mali#Niger#President tebboune
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Lys Iwannughen
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Abdelmadjid Tebboune receives Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maiga

Abdelmadjid Tebboune receives Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maiga

Algeria Gate: The President of the Republic, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, received this Monday the Prime Minister and head of government of the Republic of Mali, Abdoulaye Maiga, at the head of a major delegation.

Abdelmadjid Tebboune receives Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maiga

This meeting takes place in a context marked by the desire of Algiers and Bamako to strengthen their bilateral relations and cooperation. Several senior Algerian officials took part in the talks, including the Minister of State, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Attaf, as well as officials responsible for diplomatic and security matters.

This visit reflects the importance that both countries attach to consolidating their relations and coordinating on issues of common interest

#Algeria#Mali#President tebboune
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Lys Iwannughen
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Mali’s PM Heads to Algeria: A Sahel Pivot Toward Pragmatism, and a Blow to Morocco’s Standing

Mali’s PM Heads to Algeria: A Sahel Pivot Toward Pragmatism, and a Blow to Morocco’s Standing

Algeria Gate: Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga arrives in Algeria tomorrow, invited by his Algerian counterpart, carrying a message from President Assimi Goïta to President Tebboune, marking a thaw after a 14-month diplomatic crisis. He’ll be received by Tebboune, with talks aimed at launching bilateral cooperation.

The visit follows an August 9 phone call between the two PMs, the return of ambassadors, and the reopening of airspace in July; signs of gradual normalization. For Bamako, reconciling with Algiers reflects geographic and strategic reality: Algeria is a direct neighbor and key partner on security and development.

The move also comes as Mali’s earlier bet on Morocco’s Atlantic-access Sahel initiative has yielded little concrete progress, while Morocco faces its own economic and social strains and growing international criticism over using migration as political leverage, notably facilitating roughly 70,000 undocumented Moroccan migrants toward Ceuta.

Algeria, by contrast, points to tangible cooperation: a donated power plant in Niger, military support including helicopters and equipment, and a security approach tying its own stability to that of its neighbors.

Analysts frame Maïga’s visit as more than protocol; a sign Sahel states are prioritizing pragmatic, results-driven partnerships over unfulfilled promises, with Morocco’s regional influence appearing increasingly strained.

#Africa#Algeria#Mali
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Lys Iwannughen
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“Blood Follows Their Footsteps”: International Investigations Echo Tebboune’s Charge Against the UAE

“Blood Follows Their Footsteps”: International Investigations Echo Tebboune’s Charge Against the UAE

Bab El Djazair News Portal: Before the Financial Times described Emirati expansion in Africa as an “imperial” push, before Human Rights Watch tracked Colombian mercenaries through UAE military facilities to Sudan, and before Reuters revealed that a $50 million ransom financed an al-Qaeda attack in Mali (with three regional sources attributing the payment to the UAE), President Abdelmadjid Tebboune had already, in March 2024, mapped the danger in three countries by name: Mali, Libya and Sudan.

“Blood Follows Their Footsteps”: International Investigations Echo Tebboune’s Charge Against the UAE

He said the money of an unnamed Arab state was present “in every place where there is conflict,” listed those three countries, and declared that “patience has limits.” More than two years later, the importance of that statement lies in the precision of the geography he chose: the three arenas have successively become the subject of UN reports and international investigations into weapons, gold, mercenaries, financing and networks of influence linked to the UAE.

This does not mean every Algerian accusation has been proven, nor that the president formally named the UAE on every occasion. Yet placing the statements on a timeline and overlaying later evidence shows Algeria was reading a pattern early: massive capital moving beyond borders, ports and strategic assets, relationships with armed actors, and security and financial tools far beyond traditional investment.

“Blood Follows Their Footsteps”: International Investigations Echo Tebboune’s Charge Against the UAE

January 2024… The Warning First Came from the High Security Council

On January 10th 2024, President Tebboune chaired a High Security Council meeting on the neighbourhood and the Sahel. The statement expressed regret at “hostile actions” by a “brotherly Arab country” towards Algeria, without naming it. Media linked the reference to the UAE; the first institutional warning.

The region was changing rapidly: Mali had ended the Algiers Agreement process, Libya remained divided, and Sudan was locked in war since April 2023. Earlier Emirati support for Khalifa Haftar had already been documented, including violations of the Libyan arms embargo and a major airlift in 2020. Algeria saw external financial and military powers altering the balances around its borders.

“Blood Follows Their Footsteps”: International Investigations Echo Tebboune’s Charge Against the UAE

March 2024… Tebboune Draws the Map: Mali, Libya, Sudan

On 30 March 2024, Tebboune spoke publicly and in detail about the crisis with the Gulf state, still without naming it. He kept a diplomatic tone at first, then accused the actions of “arrogance” and drew a red line: Algeria “does not bow.”

The key phrase: “Wherever there is conflict, we find the money of this state: in Mali, in Libya, in Sudan… patience has limits.” He placed money at the heart of the economy of conflicts—who finances, who allies with whom, who can reshape the balance inside a weak state.

Anwar Gargash replied indirectly on 2 April about a “distant sisterly state” using hints against the UAE. Two months later, SWISSAID revealed that 435 tonnes of gold worth over $30 billion left Africa undeclared in 2022, with the UAE the main destination (about 405 tonnes). Over the previous decade, unrecorded African gold appearing in UAE imports exceeded 2,500 tonnes, valued at more than $115 billion. Dubai had become a central corridor for African wealth leaking outside official records.

“Blood Follows Their Footsteps”: International Investigations Echo Tebboune’s Charge Against the UAE

2025… From Warning Against a State to Warning Against a Model of Intervention

By October 2025, Tebboune said Algeria’s Gulf relations were good “except for one state,” linking the problem to interference in internal affairs and an attempt at “ruin in my house.”

On 11 November, while receiving the Somali president, he described Sudan’s tragedy as caused by “blatant interventions that stoke discord.” Amnesty International had already documented modern weapons, including from the UAE, in the Sudanese war, and later concluded that advanced Chinese weapons “almost certainly” re-exported from the UAE had reached the Rapid Support Forces. Abu Dhabi denied supporting any side. Sudan’s case against the UAE at the ICJ was dismissed in May 2025 for lack of jurisdiction.

“Blood Follows Their Footsteps”: International Investigations Echo Tebboune’s Charge Against the UAE

December 2025… Tunisia Enters Algeria’s National Security Circle

On 30 December, Tebboune warned against attempts to drive a wedge between Algeria and Tunisia, stressing that the security of both is interconnected and that Algeria does not interfere in Tunisian affairs. The doctrine was clear: non-interference is a principle of regional security, not a slogan against one adversary.

“Blood Follows Their Footsteps”: International Investigations Echo Tebboune’s Charge Against the UAE

February 2026… The Accusation Moves to Elections and Investment Capital

On 7 February, Tebboune openly accused the unnamed “state, not to say a mini-state” of intervening in Algerian elections and of threatening arbitration over investments. He closed with a severe warning: “Do not make us regret the day we came to know you.” The same day Algeria began terminating the 2013 air-services agreement with the UAE. The issue now encompassed political interference, capital and legal pressure.

July 2026… The Harshest Phrase: “Wherever They Set Foot, Blood Flows”

In a 27 July interview, Tebboune described the party as a “small state” with a “very negative” effect and uttered the sharpest line of the chronology: “Wherever they set foot, blood flows,” adding that Algeria possesses evidence. He linked Tunisia’s security directly to Algeria’s and said he would have cut relations long ago were it not for the desire to avoid further Arab divisions.

“Blood Follows Their Footsteps”: International Investigations Echo Tebboune’s Charge Against the UAE

Then Came the Documents: Mercenaries, Weapons and Sudan’s Routes

In May 2026, Human Rights Watch reported that hundreds of Colombian contractors were trained by Emiratis inside the UAE before deployment to Sudan, with the Abu Dhabi-based Global Security Services Group appearing in the recruitment. The UAE denied allowing its territory to be used for such purposes.

The Financial Times in August estimated around 2,000 Colombian fighters reached Sudan via routes through the UAE, Libya, Somalia and Chad, some trained on drones and air defence. The U.S. Treasury had already sanctioned a Colombian recruitment network in December 2025 and identified a retired Colombian officer resident in the UAE as a central figure, without officially attributing the network to the Emirati government. Reuters had earlier tracked dozens of flights from the UAE to Am Djarass in Chad that raised suspicions of supplying the Rapid Support Forces.

“Blood Follows Their Footsteps”: International Investigations Echo Tebboune’s Charge Against the UAE

Mali… The Most Dangerous Intersection with the March 2024 Statement

In March 2024 Tebboune had placed Mali at the top of the list. In August 2026 a UN Security Council experts’ report revealed that a roughly $50 million ransom paid in late 2025 financed a major JNIM attack in Mali. Three regional sources told Reuters the payer was the UAE. Usual ransoms ranged from $4–6 million; experts described $50 million as extraordinary. The UN report itself did not name the payer, but the intersection with Tebboune’s earlier warning about “money” in Mali is highly sensitive.

Libya… The Arena That Preceded the Warning

Libya’s path predated the 2024 statements. UN and rights reports had long documented Emirati support for Haftar, including drones and an airlift of at least 160 flights in early 2020. When Tebboune grouped Mali, Libya and Sudan together, Libya already stood as a living model of external financing, weapons and proxy activity. Sensitivity rose again in 2024 when Haftar’s forces moved near the Algerian border.

Ports and Gold… When Influence Becomes Economic Before It Becomes Military

The Financial Times investigation of August 2026 mapped a broader picture: more than $168 billion in announced Emirati projects in Africa since 2017 across ports, minerals, land, energy and logistics. The issue is not legitimate investment itself, but the accumulation of control at the same chokepoints—port, corridor, resource, financial centre—sometimes paired with security presence or armed alliances.

Gold remains the clearest example: if the UAE is the largest destination for unrecorded African gold, influence is measured by Dubai’s ability to turn African material into globally tradable money. Claims of systematic “buying of consciences” lack documentary proof as state policy; what is documented is a highly attractive environment for money and elites, as shown by the Dubai Unlocked investigation.

Even London… An Emirati-Financed Mercenary Outside African Arenas

An ITV News investigation of 19 August 2026 revealed that security contractor Abraham Golan, previously linked to UAE operations in Yemen, ran a surveillance operation in London in 2016 against British activist Anas al-Tikriti while receiving Emirati funds. The investigation did not prove a direct government order for assassination, but it added another example of Emirati-financed contractors operating far beyond traditional borders—reinforcing that private military tools are part of a wider pattern, not a solitary Algerian claim.

From Warning to Doctrine: Why Tebboune’s Reading Appears Prophetic

Tebboune did not predict any single report. He identified early the structure of the danger that later investigations would examine: money rather than conventional armies; Mali, Libya and Sudan rather than a narrow bilateral dispute; then internal interference, elections, investment pressure and finally the comprehensive formula of a “very negative” effect accompanied by blood.

Parallel evidence moved in the same direction: tens of billions in gold flows, alleged re-exported weapons, suspicious flights, a Colombian recruitment network, around 2,000 fighters, a $50 million ransom that reshaped jihadist financing in Mali, and ports and investments drawing a map of influence larger than the Gulf state itself.

The UAE continues to deny supporting the Rapid Support Forces or allowing mercenary recruitment on its soil, and defends its African investments as developmental partnerships (citing more than $110 billion committed between 2019 and 2023). Those replies no longer close the file, because the questions no longer come from Algeria alone.

Algeria Was Not Warning Against the UAE’s Wealth… But Against the Function of Money

Tebboune never objected to the UAE being rich or investing in Africa. Algeria itself seeks investment and maintains close ties with other Gulf states. The consistent question in his discourse was: what does money do when it leaves the economy and enters internal politics and war?

Money that builds a factory or a commercial port can create value. Money that reaches an armed faction, finances a terrorist ransom, sustains a mercenary network or pressures sovereign decisions enters a different equation entirely.

This is why Algeria’s approach to Africa is structurally opposite: it bets on projects such as the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline and the African Energy Bank, whose value rises when neighbouring states stabilise. Turning those states into conflict arenas is a direct loss for Algerian security, trade, energy and borders.

The phrase “patience has limits” in March 2024 was the beginning of an ascending chronology. Two years later came the stronger line: “Wherever they set foot, blood flows.” Between them appeared the gold data, the expanded Sudan file, Chinese weapons, mercenary sanctions, the Colombian route, the $50 million Mali ransom, and the Financial Times synthesis of ports, mines, gold and security power.

The strength of Tebboune’s reading does not lie in the sharpness of his words, but in the fact that the geography he warned about in 2024 is the same geography that in 2026 became the stage for the heaviest international investigations into Emirati influence.

Mali: money and al-Qaeda.
Libya: weapons and Haftar.
Sudan: gold, weapons and mercenaries.
Dubai: the centre where trade, money, African wealth and elites meet.

Algeria’s position has been consistent from the start: no one buys the right to reshape its neighbourhood, and investment does not become a licence to interfere in the sovereignty of states. After the investigations, the chronology of Tebboune’s statements reads less as a bilateral quarrel and more as an early record of a wider battle over who holds the decision in Africa; the African state itself, or external capital when it turns from economic partner into a tool of influence.

#Algeria#President tebboune#UAE
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Lys Iwannughen
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